Multinational trade regimes and intellectual property agreements have restructured global agriculture around imported, proprietary seed systems. Through legal harmonization, foreign aid conditionality, and private-public investment channels, countries in the Global South are increasingly dependent on external genetic resources. This architecture of dependence undermines domestic breeding capacity, erodes food system resilience, and subordinates local seed systems to foreign control.
TRIPS Agreement and Global IP Harmonization
Article 27.3(b) and UPOV 1991 Proliferation: Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement obligates all WTO members to provide intellectual property protection for plant varieties, either through patents, an “effective sui generis system,” or both. In practice, UPOV 1991 has become the global standard, heavily promoted by the U.S., EU, and Canada via accession agreements, trade conditionalities, and technical assistance packages. More than 80 countries have amended their seed laws since 2000 under WTO accession or post-accession compliance pressure, with seed IP frameworks modeled explicitly on UPOV 1991.
TRIPS-Plus in Bilateral and Regional Agreements: Bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) contain TRIPS-plus provisions that go beyond WTO minimums, requiring patent protection for plant varieties, limiting exceptions to breeders’ rights, and mandating criminal enforcement of seed IP violations. Examples include the US-Peru FTA, EU-CARIFORUM EPA, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These frameworks override domestic flexibility and restrict sovereign space for biodiversity-based or farmer-managed seed systems.
Conditionality in Aid, Trade, and Development
Aid as a vehicle for IP expansion: The USAID Seed Policy Toolkit (2018), developed in partnership with the Syngenta Foundation and other private actors, guides developing countries in adopting UPOV-compatible seed laws. The toolkit is actively used in East and Southern Africa to push regulatory harmonization under the guise of market efficiency and “seed system modernization.”
AGRA and Subsidy-Driven Displacement: The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), funded by the Gates Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, has promoted adoption of commercial seed through input subsidies, procurement contracts, and national seed reform policy frameworks. In Ghana and Zambia, AGRA programs have resulted in sharp declines in local seed use and the marginalization of indigenous varieties.
Development finance as compliance enforcement: World Bank and IMF structural adjustment packages continue to include agricultural benchmarks tied to IP alignment. “Modernization” conditions embedded in loan frameworks require the adoption of seed certification laws, liberalized seed markets, and the suppression of informal seed trade. The World Bank’s Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) index penalizes countries that permit seed exchange outside formal markets.
Seed Import Dependency and Strategic Vulnerability
Dependence on proprietary imports: As of 2025, over 60% of vegetable seed used in sub-Saharan Africa is imported, primarily from firms based in the EU, U.S., and Southeast Asia. Proprietary hybrid tomato, cabbage, and brassica seed used in Indian commercial agriculture are sourced from Syngenta, East-West Seed, and HM Clause. Local public-sector breeding programs have been systematically underfunded or dismantled, leaving countries unable to develop or distribute nationally adapted varieties at scale.
Structural exposure to supply chain disruptions: Agricultural import dependence creates strategic vulnerability to geopolitical shocks and trade disruptions. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several African and Caribbean countries experienced delayed or unavailable seed shipments, undermining seasonal production. Russian sanctions and fertilizer supply chain instability in 2022-2024 further exposed the fragility of globalized input systems reliant on foreign IP and imports.
National Case Studies of Structural Lock-In
Kenya: The Seed and Plant Varieties Act was amended in 2016 to align with UPOV 1991, criminalizing informal seed sale and use of uncertified varieties. The law disproportionately impacts smallholders and contradicts Article 11 of Kenya’s Constitution, which guarantees community rights over indigenous knowledge and resources.
Paraguay: According to REUTERS (2024), biotech companies reported $1.76 billion in annual “lost revenues” due to unauthorized soybean seed use. This figure has been used to justify aggressive legal enforcement and lobbying for criminal sanctions. The push coincides with increased litigation activity by the national seed association, backed by multinational firms.
Philippines: The adoption of biotech seed, particularly Golden Rice, has been driven by foreign investment and public-private partnerships. These programs bypass national participatory breeding institutions, including farmer cooperatives and local agricultural colleges. Critics argue that this displaces decentralized innovation and introduces dependency on foreign genetic material.
Resistance and Policy Alternatives
African Union Legal Innovation: The AU’s 2023 Model Law on Biosafety and Seed Systems explicitly rejects UPOV 1991 alignment and supports community seed banks, participatory breeding, and farmers’ rights to save, use, and exchange seed. ECOWAS and SADC are currently piloting harmonized seed laws based on the AU framework.
Constitutional recognition of seed sovereignty: Ecuador (2008), Bolivia (2009), and Venezuela (1999) have enshrined food sovereignty and seed rights in their national constitutions. These frameworks prohibit the patenting of native seed and ban genetically modified seed imports. Implementation remains contested but provides a legal foundation for farmer-centered seed governance.
Legal resistance via courts and civil society: In Colombia, the Constitutional Court struck down seed privatization provisions in Law 970 (2012), citing violations of indigenous rights, cultural preservation, and the right to food. Movements like La Via Campesina and Navdanya have used litigation, community mobilization, and seed festivals to build counter-hegemonic narratives and infrastructures of resistance.
Geopolitical Implications for Food Systems
Geographic asymmetry in seed production: Commercial seed production remains concentrated in temperate countries, particularly the U.S., France, the Netherlands, and Germany. These nations control the breeding, multiplication, and export infrastructure for the global seed trade. This concentration grants them leverage in both bilateral trade negotiations and multilateral policy forums.
Seed as diplomatic leverage: Control over seed value chains functions as a tool of foreign policy influence, particularly in fragile states and emerging markets. U.S. seed companies supported by USAID programs, and Chinese firms operating through the Belt and Road Initiative, are engaged in a quiet geopolitical competition over genetic infrastructure in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.
Reduced national policy sovereignty: Countries locked into proprietary seed supply chains face diminished autonomy in policymaking across biosafety, land use, pesticide regulation, and agricultural extension. WTO SPS and TBT rules, combined with TRIPS enforcement, limit governments' ability to favor farmer-managed or biodiverse systems without risking trade sanctions or investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) challenges.
Systemic fragility under crisis conditions: Pandemic-era disruptions, commodity shocks, and climate-induced volatility reveal that input-dependent, externally controlled seed systems are ill-equipped for long-term food security. The absence of seed sovereignty compounds vulnerability, particularly in low-income countries reliant on seasonal imports and external approvals for varietal release.